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1 Introduction
The whole notion of ‘instrumentalisation’ can
lead one into very dangerous waters – especially
in connection with something as essentially
intangible as religious belief. It comes down to a
question of sincerity of intent, or what Muslims
might call neeyat – a concept (ironically) loaded
with religious significance. One cannot actually
know the intention of a donor, policymaker, a
religious fundamentalist or a rights activist,
when they support the use of a religious
argument in advancing their goals; indeed it
would be presumptuous and discriminatory to
make any assertion about an individual’s intent.
But what is feasible, which this article aims to show,
is focusing on religion in current development policy
by international development agencies from Europe
and North America, as well as some multilateral
agencies. And from the impact of this policy, one
can trace backwards in order to comment on the
presumed institutional and collective agendas that
inform various approaches to religion in
development policy. The analysis presented here
was something I developed in the early 2000s
(Balchin 2003), and is, sadly, still applicable. It
illustrated that when approaching the question of
religion, development policy takes one of three
broad perspectives: to see religion as the main
developmental obstacle; the only developmental
issue to the exclusion of all others, and the primary
solution to developmental problems. They are not
mutually exclusive, in that any single development
agency may employ all three at the same time.
This analysis emerged from personal experience
in development, and specifically women’s rights
work in Muslim contexts. I worked for several
years with Shirkat Gah women’s resource centre1
(SG) in Pakistan, one of the country’s foremost
women’s rights organisations, and then at the
coordination office of the international solidarity
network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws
(WLUML).2 This work has continued as, while
retaining links with Pakistan and WLUML, I am
now part of Musawah,3 a global initiative for
equality and justice in the Muslim family, and a
founder of the Muslim Women’s Network-UK.4
This has given me hands-on experience of how
policymakers and donors, multilateral and
bilateral and INGOs, as well as how governments
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frame the whole question of the category
‘Muslim Women’ and how they problematise
religion and development. Other research has
reinforced this experience.
1.1 A new policy direction
Before continuing with the analysis, I would like
to comment on the notion that the
instrumentalisation of religion in development
policy represents a new policy direction, perhaps
associated with 9/11. One can trace the ‘problem
of Islam’5 back to globally significant political
developments in Afghanistan and Iran in the
1970s, and beyond. Certainly by the early 1990s,
conferences started being held about women,
religion and development (especially in the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries):
they were very specifically focused on women and
Islam. There were no conferences on women and
Catholicism and development, or on Judaism,
development and women. This trend has
continued – and with greater vigour in the post-
9/11 context, where the radicalisation of Muslim
societies has become more evident side-by-side
with the pursuit of the ‘war on terror’, and
Bush’s gag rule affected the US development
policy and the work of, for example UNIFEM,
UNFPA and the whole UN process. Moreover,
development charities influenced by
fundamentalist Catholic agendas, such as World
Vision, have impacted on HIV and AIDS work in
Africa. The impact has been to shift global
development policy to the right. Development
policy was at the time of Bush increasingly
influenced by Christian right-wing agendas.
Yet, despite the apparent concern about women
in Muslim contexts, the very essentialised
approach that characterises some development
approaches to women, religion and development
– which includes what we can call the
instrumentalisation of religion – have not
changed since the early 2000s.
2 Religion as the main developmental obstacle
Of the three approaches, the first is to see
religion as the developmental obstacle; the
presumption is that: ‘If only these people would
get rid of their religion, then development will
happen’. Such an approach ignores global and
local structural inequalities that contribute to
underdevelopment and poverty. Moreover,
religious identification is understood as a sign of
backwardness, something not ‘modern’ and thus
out of tune with the progress of development.
This is applied almost exclusively to Muslim
societies. Such an approach often characterises
all men as rights violators and women as passive
victims, which fails to interrogate political and
ideological differences and active identity choices
by both women and men. Yet research by AWID
(Association of Women’s Rights in Development)
has revealed how in the experience of women’s
rights activists, religious identification can be
part of the very modern phenomenon of religious
fundamentalisms, and that there are women who
actively support such agendas (Balchin 2008). At
the same time, Musawah and other rights-based
initiatives in Muslim contexts (as well as rights-
based movements in other religious contexts)
also demonstrate how there is nothing
intrinsically anti-human rights about religion.
3 The only developmental issue to the exclusion
of all others
The second approach sees religion as the only
developmental issue to the exclusion of all others.
It was clearly visible in development policy by the
mid-1990s and is likely an outcome of the then
contemporary global resurgence of identity
politics and essentialisation of communities. This
ignores the impact of structural factors such as
class, as well as the impact of life cycle stage,
ethnicity, etc. on developmental opportunities.
Above all, it homogenises the category ‘Muslim
women’. As I have written elsewhere on the
problem of labelling (Balchin 2007), consider
Muslim women in Britain: a Scottish white
convert, a Somali refugee and a third generation
woman of Pakistani origin. How much do they
have in common in terms of developmental needs?
And this is just within one country; is the
developmental notion ‘the problems of Muslim
women’ meaningful at all? Such an approach leads
to the production of research and analysis, such
as: ‘In many Muslim cultures, motherhood
constitutes a dominant part of Muslim concepts of
female identity’ (Netherlands Special Programme
1993: 21). In how many societies does this not
apply – whether supposedly developed or under-
developed and no matter what the local religious
belief or non-belief? What is the point in making
that assertion about Muslims – does it help
development analysis and policymaking? These
are reports and conferences that have been
funded with tax payers’ money and development
aid that multiplies the debt burden of generations
of inhabitants of the global South. To what end?
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Seeing religion as the developmental issue, means
that donor policy will necessarily privilege those
who are in representative authority and then the
search is on for religious leaders that can be
engaged in development – even if religious leaders
have to date, in a given context, played a largely
negative role in advancing rights or even if on the
ground religious authorities are actually not the
main decision-makers on a particular
developmental issue. I recall the fury of a women’s
rights activist from the Mindanao region in the
Philippines in the 1990s. A foreign bilateral
agency had apparently gathered local ulema6 in
order to produce a statement supporting women’s
reproductive rights from an Islamic perspective.
Although this was not a normal sphere of the local
ulema’s concern, the statement was duly issued,
but more importantly, the gathering facilitated
networking among the ulema that subsequently
contributed to the formation of a political
grouping that promoted a fundamentalist vision
of Islam. In other words, a development approach
reinforced conservative interpretations of religion
and strengthened the power of those who do not
have pluralism and equality at heart.
Above all, this rush to ‘find the religious’ is rarely
backed by sophisticated knowledge of the
diversities among religious groups. Many
mainstream development and human rights
organisations that have for decades identified
themselves as ‘secular’ have tended to ignore the
role of religion in society. Now having suddenly
discovered it, they lack the analytical tools
essential for an informed engagement that can
sufficiently account for the diversities of political
positions among religious groups and religious
authorities. It is fascinating that the few
mainstream development and human rights
organisations that are currently consciously
attempting to address this lack of capacity are
sometimes wary of making their effort publicly
visible. Their concern appears to be a fear of
being labelled as ‘soft on fundamentalism’ or,
more commonly, a fear of being seen to be
judging religion. In both instances, this fear is
founded on a conflation of religion and religious
organisations; while the former cannot be judged
in any empirical manner, the role of religious
organisations and their agendas in advancing or
obstructing rights can and should be judged.
Finally, approaches that privilege religion as the
developmental issue accord with the Muslim
fundamentalist assertion that Islam and Muslims
deserve ‘special’ treatment. In a perverse
distortion of the notion of ‘cultural sensitivity’, the
‘special treatment’ approach demands respect for
cultural relativist assertions, for example of how
maternal health programmes are ‘inappropriate’
for Yemeni rural communities.7 Another example
was a DFID-funded research report looking at how
Sharia8 might be used to advance women’s rights
in northern Nigeria (DFID et al. 2006). This DFID
sponsored report’s recommendations did not
match the Nigerian constitution, and its highly
conservative content was far less progressive than
the analysis of local women’s rights activists,
including those who worked within a religious
framework. Thus, local law and the local women’s
movement were brushed aside.
4 The primary solution to developmental
problems
This brings us to the third approach – that of
seeing religion as the primary developmental
solution. I regard this as analytically and
historically a non-identical twin of the second
approach, although research needs to be done to
establish more clearly the contextual factors
which led to its appearance. This approach
presumes that development, which can be a
bitter pill, will be ‘swallowed’ as long as it is
wrapped in the sugar coating of religion. The
parallels between donor policies and the Muslim
fundamentalist mantra ‘Islam is the solution’, is
not lost on rights activists from Muslim contexts.
In both, the outcome is an instrumentalisation of
religion accompanied by what, I argue, is a
negative impact on development and women’s
rights. By privileging religion, development
policy of this type ignores rights struggles that
are not framed with reference to religion –
including rights demands that are based on
concepts of citizenship. And yet Muslim societies
are invariably charged with being ‘failed states’.
How far has donor policy contributed to
strengthening a shared notion of citizenship in
Muslim majority countries?
Such development policy also reinforces the false
dichotomisation of secular and religious
approaches to development; yet in my
experience on the ground, rights work is far less
binary. For instance, Shirkat Gah’s paralegal
training for community activists focused largely
on the constitution, state law and customary
practices. But since Islam and Muslim laws are
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one of the sources of law in these spheres,
challenging the official conservative
interpretation of Muslim laws was inevitable,
including highlighting the possibility of rights-
based interpretations or at least interpretive
diversity in Muslim history. Another example is
SG’s legal awareness trainings which made
marginalised women aware of their right to mahr
(an obligatory payment by a husband to the wife
under Muslim family laws). This right was
highlighted not so much as a religious duty,
although it is derived from religious laws, but
simply as a right under legislated family laws:
thus, the lines between ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ laws
or ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ approaches are by no
means clear-cut. Moreover, where rights work is
more polarised, these donor policies can
undermine – through who and what is funded –
efforts by local rights activists to build alliances
between secular and religious frameworks and
groups. Take a hypothetical example: in India,
the relationship and alliances between those
feminist activists in Muslim communities who
work from within a religious framework and
those who prioritise secular approaches is fragile
and constantly debated; rights movements
specifically focusing on Muslim women are still
nascent. Imagine the potential for derailing local
organic processes if foreign development aid
were easily available only to those working from
within a religious framework. 
The approach of seeing religion as the
developmental solution is found not just in the
sphere of poverty and development – it is also
visible, albeit in a slightly different form, in justice
sector reform. Here, the current fashion among
some international financial institutions (IFIs)
and some multilateral and bilateral agencies, is
increasingly to assert that non-state legal systems
based on culture and religion are a solution to the
poor’s lack of access to justice due to the
inadequacies of the formal justice sector. While an
understanding of legal pluralism is absolutely vital
and welcome, the privileging of non-state and ‘from
within’ approaches to justice sector reform has
very serious implications for the human rights of
marginalised sectors of society, notably women, as
outlined in ICHRP (2009).
Privileging the role of religious organisations in
service-delivery – whether of justice or
development sectors such as health and
education – constitutes the instrumentalisation of
religion because, quite apart from its impact on
rights struggles, it undoubtedly serves a
neoliberal privatisation agenda. For instance,
extra-judicial arbitration of family matters under
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) legislation
reduces the case load burden on the formal legal
system, leaving it for more ‘serious’ matters, such
as commercial disputes. To justify this
privatisation of law, policymakers will argue that
such ADR accords more closely with people’s
cultural and religious aspirations. This approach
is visible in a diversity of contexts, including for
example Brazil, Britain and India. The way a
great many ADR systems have worked to date
may well be more in tune with hegemonic local
cultural and religious norms than the formal
legal system, but they have far less often been in
tune with the poor’s aspirations for justice and
women’s aspirations for equality.9 AWID’s
research has also found that the privatisation of
the delivery of basic services, has undoubtedly
served to strengthen the legitimacy of
conservative and fundamentalist religious groups
who have often been the only force with sufficient
resources and infrastructure to pick up the slack
in service delivery. This is happening not just
across developing countries but also in service-
delivery for minorities in developed countries.
According to Pragna Patel, of the women’s group
Southall Black Sisters, which primarily works
with Asian women in the United Kingdom:
The privatization agenda is giving religion a
space because the state then wants to offload
its functions onto religious institutions. Who
has the capacity and resources? Religious
institutions! When we have women who have
no recourse to public funds, who is it who can
give them shelter and food? The gurdwara
[Sikh temple]! …This is problematic for
women. (Balchin 2010)
Those who see religion, and specifically Islam, as
a developmental obstacle throw the net too wide;
they blame all they identify as Muslims for their
own fate and fail to see the internal contestation
over rights and responsibilities that has been a
feature of Islam since its emergence.10 At the
same time, this focus on Islam ignores the
negative impact on development of religious
fundamentalisms in other contexts. AWID’s
research11 found that in the experience of
women’s rights activists affected by all the
world’s religions, major and minor and across
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regions, religious fundamentalisms are bad for
development. For instance, the 1,600 women’s
rights activists who responded to AWID’s online
survey highlighted the negative impact of
religious fundamentalisms on a whole range of
rights that are broadly seen as part of a rights-
based development agenda: sexual and
reproductive health and rights, freedom from
violence against women, women’s political and
economic participation, and equality in family
laws – all this, quite apart from their impact on
democracy and pluralism overall. Meanwhile,
those who privilege religion as a developmental
solution also tend only to regard as legitimate
interlocutors those who visibly claim a Muslim
identity. In the case of Muslim women, this is
often stereotyped as those who veil and who hold
conservative positions about the status of women
in society. Thus, in certain instances, the
labelling inherent in these developmental
approaches fails to cast the net widely enough.
5 Conclusion
The points above indicate the profound challenges
that labels present us in development practice and
rights work today. AWID’s research in the context
of feminist strategies of resistance to religious
fundamentalisms notes that: ‘The complexities
and constant shifts that are characteristic of the
current historical moment mean that the old
categories and existing terminologies are
inadequate for capturing this reality and do not
help feminists convey what is happening on the
ground’.12 It is clear that, overall, social
movements, including development actors, are
behind in addressing the challenges of labelling.
The inadequacies of some current donor
approaches to religion and development, and
specifically approaches to women’s development
in Muslim communities, is in stark contrast to
the creative and binary-challenging initiatives
that some women’s rights activists have for
decades been using on the ground. Many local
human rights and women’s rights groups,
whether in the area of access to justice or
development more broadly, have engaged with
religion and development in contextually-specific
ways that advance rights. A more recent example
is Musawah, a global initiative for equality and
justice in the Muslim family, launched in
February 2009. While it identifies itself as led by
Muslim women, using rights-based
interpretations of religion is just one of four
approaches in its analytical framework. In its
demand for equality, the Musawah framework13
takes a holistic approach emphasising Islamic
principles, the human rights framework,
constitutional guarantees of equality and non-
discrimination, and lived realities. The extent to
which each of these four approaches is
emphasised is up to the individual activists and
organisations linked through Musawah. As a
movement that is still very much in the process of
constructing and identifying itself, Musawah, and
the intense discussions which have been part of
the development of its analytical framework,
messaging and relationships with other women’s
movements, will make for a fascinating case study
of the role of religion in women’s development.
There is a need to engage with women’s rights
activists to document their experiences of
successful engagement with religion to advance
rights in their particular contexts. There is a
broad range of this engagement – from actively
confronting religious fundamentalists to
supporting rights-based interpretations of
religion to emphasising shared national
citizenship and protecting secular spaces. There
also needs to be independent documenting of the
situations where, according to the anecdotal
accounts of some local women’s rights activists,
donor instrumentalisation of religion actually
harmed women’s rights such as in Afghanistan
and Sudan. It may be difficult for local women’s
groups to document these cases because of their
continuing dependence upon the very donors
whose policies have at times undermined their
rights work. What is important, however, is that
wherever successful strategies do emerge, these
are not simply picked up as quick fixes that are
presumed to apply as a model in all contexts. In
the case of strategies that use a religious
framework, the decontextualised application of
‘from within’ approaches can be a slippery slope
towards the instrumentalisation of religion.
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Notes
1 For further information on the Shirkat Gah
women’s resource centre, see
www.shirkatgah.org 
2 For further information on the coordination
office of the international solidarity network,
Women Living Under Muslim Laws, see
www.wluml.org 
3 For details of Musawah, a global initiative for
equality and justice in the Muslim family, see
www.musawah.org 
4 For further information on the Muslim
Women’s Network-UK, see www.mwnuk.co.uk
5 In development policy, this invariably
translates into the ‘problem of Muslim
women’, an essentially colonial practice of
instrumentalising women’s status.
6 Community religious leaders.
7 An international development agency staffer
who was confidently familiar with local power
dynamics and how culture can be used to
obstruct or advance rights, recently recounted
how she overrode such concerns and went on
to establish a highly popular local maternal
health programme. But not all development
actors have the required capacity to deal with
such situations.
8 Religious Law.
9 ICHRP 2009 includes examples of the
negative rights impacts of ADR from Brazil,
Canada, India and Pakistan. Even one of the
current foremost champions of ADR, the
World Bank in its online Access to Justice
Topic Brief notes that ‘[…] both the efficiency
and justice of various ADR schemes have been
questioned. For example, it is argued that
ADR based on traditional social relationships
may reduce women’s access to justice when
prevailing norms discriminate against
women’. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,
,contentMDK:20756347~isCURL:Y~menuP
K:1990386~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~t
heSitePK:1974062,00.html
10 For further information, see www.musawah.org/
docs/pubs/wanted/Wanted-MKM-Summary.pdf
11 For details on AWID’s research, see
www.awid.org/eng/About-AWID/AWID-
Initiatives/Resisting-and-Challenging-
Religious-Fundamentalisms/What-s-new-
from-this-initiative/New-Insights-on-
Religious-Fundamentalisms-Research-
Highlights
12 For further information, see
www.awid.org/eng/About-AWID/AWID-
Initiatives/Resisting-and-Challenging-
Religious-Fundamentalisms/What-s-new-
from-this-initiative/New-Insights-on-
Religious-Fundamentalisms-Research-
Highlights, p.114
13 For details, see www.musawah.org/
framework_action.asp
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